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THE PRICE OF LIFE: $50,000 FOR AN EGG, WHY 
NOT $1,500 FOR A KIDNEY? AN ARGUMENT TO 
ESTABLISH A MARKET FOR ORGAN 
PROCUREMENT SIMILAR TO THE CURRENT 
MARKET FOR HUMAN EGG PROCUREMENT  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Organ transplantation once again became a major headline when 
basketball star Alonzo Mourning announced his retirement from 
professional basketball on November 24, 2003, because of a life-
threatening kidney disease which required an immediate kidney 
transplant.1 Within the next two days, nearly 30 people had called the 
Kidney and Urology Foundation of America asking to donate a kidney 
specifically to Mourning.2 Less than one month later, an unidentified 
family member donated a kidney to Mourning, who underwent a 
successful transplant.3 Mourning was very fortunate; in 2000, the average 
waiting period for a kidney transplant was 1,195 days, over 3 years.4
Solid organ transplants became a medical life-saving reality when Dr. 
Joseph Murray successfully transplanted a kidney from one identical twin 
to his brother on December 23, 1954.5 The progress of organ 
transplantation was slow, due partly to limited physiological knowledge 
and partly to doctors’ initial inability to control organ rejection.6 However, 
success did finally come for organs other than kidneys: the first successful 
 1. ‘Zo Can’t Go Mourning Forced to Retire, Will Need Kidney Transplant, at http:// 
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/basketball/nba/11/24/mourning.health.ap/index.html (last updated Nov. 
24, 2003). 
 2. Supporters Offer to Donate Kidney to Mourning, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003/ 
basketball/nba/11/26/mourning.kidney.donors.ap/index.html (last updated Nov. 26, 2003). 
 3. Mourning Undergoes Kidney Transplant Surgery, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2003 
/basketball/nba/12/19/bc.bkn.mourning.surgery.ap/index.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2003). Playwright 
Neil Simon also recently underwent a kidney transplant. Neil Simon receives kidney transplant—
report, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/03/03/simon.kidney.ap/index.html (last updated Mar. 
3, 2004). Simon had been receiving dialysis treatment three times a week when his longtime publicist 
and friend of 25 years, Bill Evans, donated a kidney to him. Id. 
 4. United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), at http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptStrat.asp 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2004).  
 5. DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A 
PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 1 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 2002); DAVID PRICE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 3 (2000); UNOS timeline, at http://www.unos.org/ 
whoWeAre/history.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).  
 6. PRICE, supra note 5, at 3 n.11 (noting that initial transplants were only performed between 
identical twins in order to avoid rejection problems).  
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liver transplant was performed in 1967, the first successful heart transplant 
was in 1968, and the first successful single lung transplant came in 1983.7 
A major medical advance came in 1983 when cyclosporine, an 
immunosuppressant drug that reduces the probability of organ rejection, 
was first approved for use.8 This discovery enabled researchers to switch 
their focus solely from living organ donors to cadaveric organ donors.9 
These advances in transplantation medicine inevitably led to an increased 
demand for organ transplants evidenced by a long waiting list that had 
formed by 1993.10
The supply of transplantable organs has never been able to keep pace 
with the demand for transplantable organs, resulting in a shortage.11 As of 
January 16, 2005, there were 87,315 people in the United States on a 
waiting list for an organ transplant.12 This number, however, does not 
represent the actual organ shortage.13 The actual shortage of transplantable 
organs is measured by the increase in the number of people on the organ 
waiting list from one year to the next.14 At the end of 2001, there were 
 7. Id. at 3 n.12; UNOS timeline, at http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/history.asp (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2004). 
 8. PRICE, supra note 5, at 3; UNOS timeline, at http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/history.asp 
(last visited Aug. 19, 2004).  
 9. PRICE, supra note 5, at 3. An important milestone was reached in 2001, the first year in 
which the number of living organ donors (6,560) surpassed the number of cadaveric organ donors 
(6,081). University Renal Research and Education Association; United Network for Organ Sharing, 
2003 Annual Report of the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific 
Registry of Transplant Recipients: Transplant Data 1992–2002, Rockville (MD): Department of 
Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Office of Special 
Programs, Division of Transplantation, at http://www.optn.org/AR2003/default.htm (last visited Aug. 
19, 2004) (table 1.1) [hereinafter 2003 UNOS Annual Report]. This trend continued in 2002 with 
6,618 living organ donors and 6,182 cadaveric organ donors. 2003 UNOS Annual Report, supra, at 
figure III-6. 
 10. 2003 UNOS Annual Report, supra note 9, at table 1.3 (showing that as of 1993, there were 
31,694 people waiting for organ transplants); see also KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 8 
(speculating that transplant waiting lists for cadaveric organs began to appear as early as the 1970s). 
 11. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that the number of organs supplied each 
year is far below the number demanded for transplant). This is also evidenced by the fact that 6,385 
people died in 2002 while awaiting an organ transplant. 2003 UNOS Annual Report, supra note 9, at 
table 1.7.  
 12. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). 
 13. David Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 567, 569–73, 579 (2002) (addressing four of the main economic misconceptions relating 
to proposals for organ markets commonly seen in academic literature and identifying one as assuming 
that the number of patients on the transplant waiting list is the direct measure of the shortage). 
 14. Id. at 571. Kaserman defines a shortage as “a condition in which the quantity of a product 
demanded exceeds the quantity supplied at the existing price.” Id. at 570 (emphasis added). Under 
existing policy in the United States, the price for organs is zero. Kaserman and Barnett argue that if the 
price for organs were raised, even minimally, this would result in an increase in the supply of 
transplantable organs, thereby eliminating the current shortage. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, 
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80,586 people waiting for an organ transplant.15 At the end of 2000, there 
were 75,006 people on the waiting list, a difference of 5,580.16 This 
number represents the actual shortage of organs for the year 2001.17 
Interestingly, in 2001, 6,584 people died while on the organ transplant 
waiting list.18 These figures suggest that if organ donations were increased 
to a level sufficient to alleviate the shortage, fewer people would have died 
while awaiting an organ transplant.19
This Note proposes that a system of financial compensation, similar to 
the system already in place for egg (oocyte) donation, should be 
established for organ donation to increase the supply of transplantable 
organs and alleviate the current critical shortage. Financial compensation 
for the donation of human eggs is used as a basis for comparison because 
eggs, like organs, are not renewable; there is a fixed supply of each within 
the body.20 Additionally, the process of harvesting eggs is physically 
invasive, as is the process for harvesting human organs.21
Part II of this Note briefly describes the current procurement systems 
for organ and egg donation, proposed methods to increase organ donation, 
and the scientific background and historic legal treatment of both organ 
at 21. 
 15. 2003 UNOS Annual Report, supra note 9, at table 1.3.  
 16. Id.  
 17. Kaserman, supra note 13, at 571. It is important to note that the possible supply of 
transplantable organs each year far exceeds the shortage of organs. See generally Ellen Sheehy, et al., 
Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667 
(2003). Thus, there is room to grow and increase the supply of transplantable organs from an 
underused supply. Id. at 667. The Sheehy study analyzed the size of the possible pool of organ donors 
and assessed various ways to increase donation. Id. The estimated number of potential organ donors 
for 1999 was 13,317, while the actual number of donors was 5,849. Id. at 669 (table 1). The study 
recognized three areas where donations could be increased: hospital referral to the Organ Procurement 
Organizations (OPOs), requests made to families, and the consent rate of families. Id. at 672. See infra 
note 74 for a description of the functions of OPOs. Of these three options, “[t]he greatest opportunity 
for increasing the rate of donation . . . lies in increasing the consent rate.” Id. at 673. The study found 
that only 54% of families consented to donation, while 80% of hospitals referred potential donors to 
OPOs and 84% of family requests were made. Id. at 672. A system of financial compensation would 
likely result in a higher rate of consent from potential donors’ families, thus increasing the supply of 
transplantable organs and alleviating the critical shortage. Id. at 673. 
 18. 2003 UNOS Annual Report, supra note 9, at table 1.7. 
 19. Id. The shortage of organs for 2001 was 5,580 while the number of people who died while on 
the waiting list was 6,584. Id. Assuming that the shortage directly resulted in deaths for those awaiting 
transplants, elimination of the shortage would mean that only 1,004 people would have died while 
awaiting an organ transplant in 2001. 
 20. EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMY 165–
66 (2001) (human eggs do not regenerate after birth, unlike human sperm, which are constantly 
renewed within the body).   
 21. Id. at 166. See infra notes 30–46, 117–34 and accompanying text (describing the medical 
procedures required for harvesting organs and egg donation).  
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donation and egg donation in the United States.22 Part III describes the 
proposal for financial compensation of organ donors and illustrates how it 
is justified because it is analogous to the current financial compensation 
system for egg donors.23
II. HISTORY 
A. The Current System of Organ Procurement and Allocation 
Organ transplantation policy evolved amidst a system of altruism.24 
Before immunosuppressant drugs were approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in the early 1980s, most organ transplants were 
procured from living donors, generally relatives of the recipient: “organ 
transplant candidates, in effect, brought the necessary donor with them 
when they checked into the hospital for the transplant operation.”25 
However, with the emergence of immunosuppressant therapy, cadaveric 
organ donor transplantation became a viable alternative to living organ 
donor transplantation.26 This in turn caused recipients who were unable to 
find their own living donor to form waiting lists for cadaveric donor 
organs.27
Third party payment for organ transplants became increasingly 
prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s with the Federal End Stage Renal 
Disease Program and many private insurance companies providing 
coverage for the costs of organ transplants.28 This coverage also increased 
the available pool of organ recipients, again leading to a longer waiting list 
and a larger shortage.29
 22. See infra Part II.
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7–9 (describing the technological evolution of 
organ transplants and arguing that “a system of ‘altruistic’ supply seemed to make sense in such a 
setting.”). 
 25. Id. at 7. This was due to tissue-matching and organ rejection problems. If a donor could not 
find a compatible living donor she generally would not receive a transplant because of the lack of 
immunosuppressant drugs that would defeat rejection. Id. 
 26. Id. at 8.  
 27. Id.; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text (speculating that waiting lists for organs 
began to form in the 1970s). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 426-1 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr (2000); see also KASERMAN & BARNETT, 
supra note 5, at 8 (during the mid-1980s, private insurance companies increasingly began to provide 
coverage for . . . organ transplants.”). This movement began in part because organ transplantation 
moved from the realm of experimental treatment to accepted medical treatment with its increased 
success rate. Id.  
 29. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that third party payment for kidney 
dialysis and transplants “undoubtedly increased the effective demand for kidney transplants . . . by 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/10
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B. The Science Behind Organ Donation 
There are two types of organ donors: living and cadaveric.30 Before 
immunosuppressant drugs were widely available, only related living 
donors were used in organ transplants and almost exclusively for kidney 
transplants.31 Today, living donors are still mainly used for kidney and, 
more recently, liver transplants.32 Three requirements must be met before a 
living donor transplant will be performed: (1) the chance of success must 
be high; (2) the risk to the donor must be low and acceptable to the donor, 
the recipient, and the physician; and (3) the living donor must give her 
informed consent for the donation.33 Once these conditions are satisfied, 
keeping many more potential transplant recipients alive for much longer periods of time through 
dialysis treatments.”). This increase in the available recipient pool, with no similar increase in the 
available donor pool, has led to greater shortages of transplantable organs. Id. 
 30. Richard D.M. Allen et al., The Living Organ Donor, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION FOR 
TRANSPLANTATION 162 (Jeremy R. Chapman et al. eds., 1997); Mark Deierhoi, Organ Recovery From 
Cadaveric Donors, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION FOR TRANSPLANTATION, supra, at 152. Within 
the cadaveric donor category there is a further distinction between non-heart-beating cadaveric donors 
and brain dead cadaveric donors. Kelly Ann Keller, Comment, The Bed of Life: A Discussion of Organ 
Donation, Its Legal and Scientific History, and a Recommended “Opt-out” Solution to Organ 
Scarcity, 32 STETSON L. REV. 855, 875 (2003). Non-heart-beating cadaveric donors are declared dead 
upon a cessation of cardiac activity. Id. Brain dead cadaveric donors are declared dead when the entire 
brain is void of any activity. Id. For the purposes of this Note, non-heart-beating donors and brain dead 
donors will be treated as a single group called cadaveric donors. 
 31. Allen et al., supra note 30, at 162–63; see also supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text. 
Recently, many transplant centers have begun to perform paired organ exchanges as an alternative to 
related living donor transplants. Karen Rivedal, Teamwork Makes Transplants Possible, WIS. STATE 
J., Nov. 23, 2003, at I-4. Paired organ exchanges “[allow] a donor who is incompatible with an 
intended recipient to instead give the organ to another couple, in exchange for a usable organ from that 
couple.” Id. In addition to helping save a loved one’s life, the organ donors also benefit in that if they 
later become ill and are in need of an organ transplant, they are automatically placed at the top of the 
waiting list. Id. For a more in-depth analysis of paired organ exchanges see Michael T. Morley, 
Increasing the Supply of Organs for Transplantation Through Paired Organ Exchanges, 21 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 221 (2003). For an article opposing paired organ exchanges, arguing that they violate 
the no valuable consideration provision of the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), see Jerry 
Menikoff, Organ Swapping, 29 HASTINGS CTR. REP. No. 6, at 28 (1999). 
 32. Allen et al., supra note 30, at 162. Every person has two kidneys, but needs only one to 
maintain proper functioning, which allows the donor to give up one kidney if she chooses. Id. at 169. 
Living liver donation is a more recent medical advance, with its first success in 1989. UNOS timeline, 
at http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/history.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). While each person has 
only one liver, it “can be thought of as two separate organs.” Allen et al., supra note 30, at 186. Thus, 
living liver donors will have half of their liver surgically detached and removed for transplantation. Id. 
Living liver donation recipients are most often children with hereditary liver disease. Id. In addition to 
living kidney and liver donations, some hospitals perform living lung, pancreas, or small bowel 
transplants as well, though with less success. Id. at 192–94. 
 33. Allen et al., supra note 30, at 162. Allen recognizes that the first two requirements are easily 
established by the medical team supervising the transplant. Id. However, the third requirement is more 
troublesome because the medical team must determine if the donor is experiencing outside pressure 
from family and the transplant team to consent to the donation. Id. This requirement is where many 
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the donor and the recipient must be tissue-matched to ensure a successful 
transplant.34 The donor is then screened for various diseases that would 
preclude donation including HIV, hepatitis, hypertension, diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, and respiratory disease.35 Both the recipient and 
the donor undergo their operations in the same hospital.36 Once the organ 
is removed from the donor, it is cooled with organ preservation fluid and 
almost immediately transplanted into the recipient.37
As medical technology advanced, especially in the area of 
immunosuppressive therapy, cadaveric organ donor transplantation 
became a feasible alternative to living organ donor transplantation.38 
Cadaveric donors are screened for infectious diseases, cancers, diabetes, 
and other diseases.39 Additionally, specific medical tests are run for each 
organ that may be transplanted to assess its viability.40 Once a cadaveric 
donor is identified, consent must be obtained for the organ donation.41 If 
possible, cadaveric donors are generally kept on life support systems after 
brain death to keep the organs “alive” and functioning as long as 
possible.42
Harvesting organs involves many surgeons working simultaneously.43 
Before the harvesting operation begins, the cadaveric donor has cold 
preservation fluid pumped into her blood stream to extend the viability of 
the organs intended for transplantation.44 The heart is removed first, then 
the lungs, liver, pancreas, and kidneys.45 Additionally, the skin, corneas, 
and bone marrow can be removed for transplantation.46
ethical considerations come into play. Id.  
 34. Id. at 173. Initially a blood test is done, and if there is a match, further tissue-typing of 
antibodies is performed to ensure that the risk of rejection will be low. Id.  
 35. Id. at 172 (table 10.3 shows absolute and relative exclusion criteria for living kidney 
donations).  
 36. Id. at 178.  
 37. Id. at 180.  
 38. Deierhoi, supra note 30, at 152.  
 39. Id. at 152–53.  
 40. Id. at 154 (table 9.1 shows specific medical tests performed on potential cadaveric donors for 
each possible transplantable organ).  
 41. Consent can be obtained from either the donor’s records (a driver’s license for example) or 
more commonly from the donor’s next of kin. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 9.  
 42. Deierhoi, supra note 30, at 156.  
 43. Id. at 157.  
 44. PRICE, supra note 5, at 159. 
 45. Deierhoi, supra note 30, at 159. 
 46. PRICE, supra note 5, at 4. Most recently, Dr. John Barker, director of plastic surgery research 
at the University of Louisville in Kentucky, claimed that his team has all the necessary medical 
knowledge to transplant a human face. William Allen, Louisville Doctors Studying Face Transplants 
Weigh Ethical Issues, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 16, 2003, at 1A. Barker asserts 
that the medical procedure is essentially the same as a hand transplant, which was successfully 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/10
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C. Legal Treatment of Organ Donation 
In 1984, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 
which implicitly implemented a policy of altruism by making it “unlawful 
for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human 
transplantation.”47 The NOTA delegated the power to establish and 
operate an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) 
charged with maintaining a national list of those waiting for organ 
donations and establishing nationwide procurement and allocation systems 
to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.48 The 
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) has held the federal contract 
for operating the OPTN since its establishment in 1986.49 UNOS manages 
organ procurement and allocation for the entire United States.50
performed in Louisville five years ago. Id. Facial transplants are designed to benefit “people whose 
faces have been badly burned, ravaged by cancer or seriously injured in accidents.” Id. Surgeons 
would remove the donor’s skin and some underlying tissues, then lay the tissue over the recipient’s 
bone and cartilage and reconnect everything, including blood vessels and nerves. Id. If the transplant 
were successful the recipient would be required to take immunosuppressant drugs for the rest of her 
life. Id. There are enormous ethical issues surrounding the possibility of a face transplant, including 
the possibility that recipients would want to specify the racial or ethnic background of their donor. Id. 
These concerns are beyond the scope of this Note.   
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000); see also KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 8 (explaining 
that the NOTA was passed in response to pressure from the medical community due to a physician in 
Virginia who attempted to set up a brokerage business for human kidneys); Susan Hankin Denise, 
Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1985) (providing a detailed account of 
the Virginia doctor and his attempt to broker human kidneys). 
 The NOTA specifically defines a “human organ” as “human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, 
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and any other human 
organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services by regulation.” 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2) (2000). It is important to note the 
difference between a system of organ procurement and a system of organ allocation. Organ 
procurement involves acquiring transplantable organs from donors. Kaserman, supra note 13, at 575. 
Organ allocation involves distributing those transplantable organs to recipients on waiting lists. Id. 
 49. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/theOPTN.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).  
 50. Id. UNOS set up and manages the following allocation process for transplantable organs. 
Once organs are donated, the local OPO alerts the UNOS organ center and a donor/recipient match is 
run for each potential transplantable organ. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org/whatWeDo/ 
organCenter.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). The match list is then ranked according to specific 
criteria for each organ (blood type, size of organ, and the medical emergency of the recipient, for 
example). Id. The OPO that procured the organ calls the transplant center that has the highest listed 
patient and offers the organ. Id. Successive calls are made until the organ is placed. Id. Arrangements 
are then made for transportation of the organ and for the transplant surgery. Id. Currently, every 
hospital that has a transplant program, every OPO, and every histocompatibility lab in the United 
States is a member of UNOS. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/membership.asp (last visited 
Aug. 19, 2004). There are 59 individual OPOs in the United States today, divided among 11 regions, 
each covering a specific geographic area. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/OPOs.asp (last 
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In addition to the NOTA, all states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted some form of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).51 The 
UAGA allows anyone over the age of 18 to make, or refuse to make, an 
anatomical gift of a part of their body.52 The UAGA defines a part as “an 
organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or other portion of a human 
body.”53 The UAGA provides guidelines for authorizing a gift54 and for 
removal of any organs.55 Finally, the UAGA prohibits any person from 
“knowingly, for valuable consideration, purchas[ing] or sell[ing] a part for 
transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to occur after 
the death of the decedent.”56  
Thus, both state and federal laws have prohibited the sale of human 
organs for nearly two decades.57 However, these prohibitions have not 
stopped some from trying to sell their organs.58  
visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
 51. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) was originally drafted in 1968 (and revised in 
1987); by 1973 every state and the District of Columbia had adopted some form of it. UNIF. 
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 4–6 (2003).  
 52. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 24 (2003). 
 53. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1(7), 8A U.L.A. 18 (2003). There is some debate over 
whether this definition is broad enough to include the sale of human eggs, but it is generally agreed 
upon that it does not prohibit the sale of human eggs. See generally Susan L. Crockin, Statutory and 
Case Law Governing Oocyte and Embryo Donation, in PRINCIPLES OF OOCYTE AND EMBRYO 
DONATION 241, 254 (Mark V. Sauer ed., 1998) (surveying various state and federal laws prohibiting 
the sale of babies and organs to determine if they apply to the sale of human eggs). 
 54. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 24–27 (2003). In order to make an anatomical 
gift the donor must execute a signed document stating her intent to donate. Id. § 2(b). Additionally, the 
document of gift may name a specific doctor or surgeon who is to perform the operation. Id. § 2(d). 
Finally, any anatomical gift may be revoked or amended in writing or orally in the presence of 
witnesses. Id. § 2(f). 
 55. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4, 8A U.L.A. 38–39 (2003). This section authorizes a 
coroner, medical examiner, or other local public health official to release and permit the removal of the 
donor’s organs for transplantation or therapy in accordance with the donor’s wishes. Id. 
 56. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003). This language seemingly leaves 
the sale of human organs from living donors unregulated. In fact, the Comment to this section of the 
UAGA specifically states that “[i]t does not cover the sale by living donors if removal is intended to 
occur before death.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 62 (2003) (emphasis added). 
However, the NOTA provisions presumably would still work to prohibit the sale of human organs 
from a living donor. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e. It is also worth noting that the 1968 UAGA did not include 
a section prohibiting the sale of human organs, so this practice was completely unregulated until the 
1984 NOTA was enacted. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1 et. seq., 8A U.L.A. 109–55 (2003). 
 57. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text. 
 58. Recently, a British man listed his kidney for sale on the online auction site eBay for a 
minimum bid of $85,000 in order to raise money for treatment of his daughter’s cerebral palsy. EBay 
Removes Ad for Sale of Human Kidney, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/12/05/ 
britain.kidney.ap/index.html (last updated Dec. 5, 2003). Representatives of eBay quickly removed the 
ad citing a policy forbidding the sale of any human body parts on the auction site. Id. 
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D. Proposed Reforms to the Current System of Organ Procurement 
Designed to Increase Organ Donation 
The first system that has been proposed for increasing organ donation 
is termed presumed consent or opt-out.59 This system begins with an initial 
presumption that organs will be procured unless individuals have 
specifically stated their intent to the contrary.60 Thus, potential cadaveric 
donors will have their organs removed for transplantation under this 
system, unless they have affirmatively opted-out at some point during their 
life.61 This would presumably increase the number of transplantable 
organs because it requires affirmative action to become a non-donor, as 
opposed to the current system in the United States, which requires 
affirmative action to become a donor.62 Thus those who do not take action 
will be donors under a presumed consent system when they would not be 
donors under the current system.63
A number of European countries have adopted this regime and some, 
but not all, have seen an increase in organ procurement rates.64 
Additionally, many states in the United States have adopted a presumed 
consent regime for cornea procurement.65 Finally, the UAGA allows for 
organs to be removed under a presumed consent regime, with certain 
qualifications.66 While the presumed consent system has been successfully 
 59. Keller, supra note 30, at 861. 
 60. Paul Michielsen, Informed or Presumed Consent Legislative Models, in ORGAN AND TISSUE 
DONATION FOR TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 30, at 344. See generally Linda C. Fentiman, Organ 
Donation as National Service: A Proposed Federal Organ Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
1593 (1993) (proposing that the United States adopt a system of presumed consent for organ donation 
and presenting a draft of the proposed law).  
 61. This opting-out could be done in many possible ways, through a will, a non-donor card, or a 
driver’s license designation of non-donor. Keller, supra note 30, at 861. 
 62. See generally supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 63. Michielsen, supra note 60, at 358 (concluding that “[t]he bulk of evidence indicates that 
presumed consent laws create an environment more likely to lead to higher rates of organ retrieval 
than informed consent.”). 
 64. PRICE, supra note 5, at 86–89. Thirteen of 28 European countries surveyed had some form of 
presumed consent regime. Id. After Belgium passed its law there was a 114% increase in kidneys 
available for transplant. Id. at 89. However, the Netherlands and Germany, which adopted similar 
regimes, did not experience similar increases. Id. 
 65. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 765.5185 (2003) (allowing medical examiners to remove a decedent’s 
corneas without consent if certain requirements are met). Additionally, 17 other states allow for the 
removal of corneas or pituitary glands without the decedent’s consent under certain circumstances. 
Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues for Research After Life, 
24 AM. J.L. & MED. 261, 288 n.282 (1998). 
 66. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 4, 8A U.L.A. 38–39 (2003) (allowing for organ procurement 
via presumed consent provided that a reasonable effort has been made to determine the decedent’s 
wishes and the wishes of the decedent’s family). 
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implemented in a variety of contexts, there are several reasons why this is 
not an adequate solution to the current shortage of transplantable organs in 
the United States.67
The main criticism of a presumed consent regime is that it results in a 
reduction of personal autonomy or, phrased differently, it causes 
coercion.68 This system makes silence the equivalent of consent.69 Some 
people may fail to consider their own mortality and never make known 
their wishes not to be organ donors; thus, they lose their autonomy and are 
forced into having their organs harvested despite their wishes to the 
contrary.70
The second proposed reform for increasing the supply of transplantable 
organs is simply increasing public awareness; this is best exemplified by a 
recently-passed amendment to the NOTA.71 The bill provides funding for 
demonstration projects, education, and public awareness of organ 
donation, with the intent of increasing the rate of organ donation.72 This 
 67. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 68. PRICE, supra note 5, at 113. Recently the United Kingdom rejected the adoption of a 
presumed consent regime for organ donation because of the belief that “consent must be obtained to 
use human organs and tissue whether from the living or after death.” Reuters, UK Rules Out Presumed 
Consent for Organ Donation (Jan. 14, 2004), at http://www.reuters.com/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml 
?type=topNews&storyID=4128579 (statement of Health Minister Rosie Winterton). British 
government officials also noted that “[t]here is no evidence that a policy of presumed consent 
increases the number of organs for transplantation.” Id. 
 69. PRICE, supra note 5, at 113. “There is a distinct possibility of organs being removed under a 
[presumed consent] regime where the deceased has remained silent, despite the deceased possessing an 
objection to organ donation.” Id. 
 70. Id. Presumed consent “takes advantage of the public’s general reluctance to dissent and 
ignorance or temporary confusion of those who do not wish to donate but do not register their 
objection.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 71. Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act, S. 573, 108th Cong. (2003). The stated 
purpose of the bill is to:  
improve the overall process of organ donation and recovery, enhance our knowledge base in 
these fields, encourage novel approaches to this growing problem [of a critical shortage of 
transplantable organs] and increase the number of organs available for transplants each year. 
The bill also seeks to remove potential barriers to donation, while identifying and focusing on 
best practices in organ donation. 
149 CONG. REC. S3330 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist). An amended version of the 
original bill was passed by the Senate on November 25, 2003. 149 CONG. REC. S16,068 (daily ed. 
Nov. 25, 2003).  
 72. S. 573, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). The demonstration projects provision essentially allows for 
studies to be performed, in a clinical setting, to test how various incentives will affect organ donation 
rates. Id. The bill appropriates $15 million for fiscal year 2004 to be granted to states, hospitals, and 
other entities to carry out programs designed to increase organ donation. Id. § 4(e). 
 Another bill was introduced by Senator Frist on the same day called the Gift of Life Congressional 
Medal Act of 2003. S. 572, 108th Cong. (2003). This bill provides that organ donors (or their family in 
the case of cadaveric donors), will be eligible to receive a commemorative congressional medal to 
recognize their gift of life. Id. § 3. The purpose of this bill is to “encourage potential donors and 
enhance public awareness of the importance of organ donation to the over 80,000 Americans waiting 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/10
p1225 Sobota book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] ESTABLISHING AN ORGAN PROCUREMENT MARKET 1235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
very conservative approach will fund clinical studies in an effort to 
increase awareness and ideally, rates of organ donation.73 The bill also 
allows grants to be made to states and qualified Organ Procurement 
Organizations (OPOs)74 for the purpose of reimbursing the travel expenses 
of living donors associated with organ donation.75 However, the bill also 
provides that if the donor’s expenses are already paid by another source 
(an insurance policy, state program, or the organ recipient) then the living 
donor is not eligible to receive any further payment under the bill.76 With 
this provision it is clear that the payment of travel expenses is not treated 
as financial compensation for donating an organ, thus the NOTA’s 
provision prohibiting valuable consideration for organ donation is left 
intact.77  
A third proposed reform to the current system of organ procurement is 
to increase the supply of transplantable organs through 
xenotransplantation (transplantation between species, generally from 
animals to humans).78 The major medical obstacle with 
xenotransplantation is organ rejection due to physiological differences 
for a transplant.” 149 CONG. REC. S3330 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist).  
 73. See generally S. 573, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 74. S. 573, 108th Cong. § 3(a) (2003). OPOs are non-profit entities that perform the following 
functions: approaching families about organ donation after a loved one has died, determining the 
medical suitability of possible donors, increasing public awareness of organ donation, and managing 
the recovery, preservation and transportation of donated organs. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org/ 
whoWeAre/OPOs.asp (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
 75. S. 573, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003). The bill also states that preference for funding shall be given 
to those who “are more likely to be otherwise unable to meet such expenses.” Id. § 3(b). For each 
fiscal year, 2004 through 2008, $5 million will be appropriated to fund this endeavor. Id. § 3(f). 
 76. S. 573, 108th Cong. § 3(d) (2003).  
 77. The NOTA itself states that valuable consideration does not include the travel expenses of a 
living donor. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2000) (“The term ‘valuable consideration’ does not include . . . 
expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with 
the donation of the organ.”). 
 78. David J.G. White, Xenotransplantation—A Solution to the Donor Organ Shortage, in ORGAN 
AND TISSUE DONATION FOR TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 30, at 446–47. White notes that the 
shortage of transplantable organs could be alleviated if xenotransplantation became an effective 
substitute because breeding programs of suitable animal donors could be set up to ensure that an 
adequate supply of animal organs are available for transplant. Id. at 447. 
 Xenotransplantation made headlines in 1984 when a baboon heart was transplanted into a 15 day-
old infant, dubbed Baby Fae, who was born with an incomplete heart; she survived for 20 days. Frank 
Morgan, Babe the Magnificent Organ Donor? The Perils and Promises Surrounding 
Xenotransplantation, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 127, 142–44 (1997). However, 
xenotransplantation was not new in the 1980s; it began as early as the 1960s with patients receiving 
chimpanzee hearts and baboon kidneys. Id. at 142–43. More recently, scientists have been using pig 
pancreatic cells to treat diabetes in teenagers, reportedly with some success. A.S. Daar, 
Xenotransplantation: Recent Scientific Developments and Continuing Ethical Discourse, 35 
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2821 (2003). 
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between humans and animals.79 Additionally, there are major ethical and 
moral issues associated with xenotransplantation which are beyond the 
scope of this Note.80
The final reform proposed for increasing organ donation is some sort of 
market system or financial compensation for organ donors.81 As a starting 
point, it is important to note that markets for human body parts already 
exist, specifically for blood, blood products, sperm, eggs, and even human 
hair.82 However, opponents of markets for human organs are quick to point 
out the distinction between the above products, usually termed tissues, and 
organs or body parts.83 These opponents claim that tissues are renewable, 
whereas organs are nonrenewable.84 The United States legal system has 
embraced this distinction by treating the sale of blood products to be the 
sale of services, not the sale of goods, implying that people do not have a 
property interest in their blood.85 Because of this renewable-nonrenewable 
 79. White, supra note 78, at 447–48; see also S. Gregory Boyd, M.D., Comment, Considering a 
Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 417, 428–30 (2003) (discussing xenotransplantation as 
a new source of donor organs). A government body in Australia recently recommended that clinical 
trials should be carried out in transplanting pig tissues and organs into humans. Patrick Goodenough, 
Pig-to-Human Organ Transplant Trials Recommended in Australia, Cybercast News Service, Jan. 14, 
2004, at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=%5CForeignBureaus%5Carchive 
%5C200401%5CFOR20040114a.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). The recommendation was partly 
based on research at Massachusetts General Hospital where genetically modified pig kidneys were 
transplanted into baboons. Id. The grafts survived for 81 days, suggesting that rejection in 
xenotransplantation due to physiological differences between species could be controlled. Id. 
 80. For a succinct overview of the advantages and disadvantages of xenotransplantation see C. 
Hammer, Xenotransplantation, The Good, The Bad and The Ugly or How Far Are We to Clinical 
Application?, 35 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1256 (2003).  
 81. See generally Boyd, supra note 79, at 417–18; David E. Jefferies, Note, The Body as 
Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621 
(1998) (describing various countries that currently employ a free market system for organ 
procurement). 
 82. RUSSELL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 180, 190 (1981). In fact, human teeth and hair 
were being sold on the open market as early as the Elizabethan era. Id. at 180.   
 83. Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn’t it Time We 
Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 151, 
153 (2002) (stating that tissues are treated differently under the law than body parts); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (defining organ to specifically exclude blood and blood products). 
 84. “Current national and state laws permit both the donation and sale of regenerative tissue such 
as blood, sperm, ovum, cells, hair, and other such body products.” Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical 
Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ 
Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 47 (1995). Banks’ statement is incorrect in a 
fundamental way; ovum (human eggs) are not regenerative: “each woman has a finite, if large, number 
of eggs.” JACKSON, supra note 20, at 165. 
 85. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that the sale of blood 
is the sale of a service, not the sale of goods, so as to avoid products liability issues). Since Perlmutter, 
most states have codified its holding that blood sales are sales of services, not sales of goods. SCOTT, 
supra note 82, at 193. This distinction is supported by the assumption that the tissue being sold is 
“incidental to the provision of medical services.” Banks, supra note 84, at 73. 
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distinction, the law in the United States does not recognize a generalized 
property interest in one’s body tissues.86
Despite the fact that the law does not recognize a generalized property 
interest in one’s body parts, many commentators and, more recently, even 
the American Medical Association (AMA) have advocated investigating 
some system of financial compensation for organ donors to increase the 
supply of transplantable organs.87 Suggestions have included a futures 
market for human organs,88 an open market for human organs,89 a tax 
incentive for organ donors,90 and a funeral stipend for the families of 
cadaveric organ donors.91
 86. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a patient 
whose cells were used for medical research that resulted in a large profit could not prevail against the 
researchers on a theory of conversion of his cells). See generally Helen R. Bergman, Comment, Moore 
v. Regents of the University of California, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 127 (1992) (providing an in-depth 
analysis of the Moore decision). Some commentators argue that property interests should be 
recognized in body tissue and cells. See, e.g., Jordan & Price, supra note 83, at 152. “[T]he law has 
failed to address many of the legal issues raised by . . . medical innovations in an adequate fashion.” 
Id. at 153. Jordan and Price argue that existing property rights were created before explosive growth in 
the biotechnology industry, which has proved to be a “lucrative market for human tissue and cells.” Id. 
at 170. Thus, commentators argue that a right of commerciality in one’s body tissue and cells should 
be recognized. Id. 
 87. Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donation Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 51 (2003) (testimony of 
Robert M. Sade, Member, American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs) 
[hereinafter Hearings]. The American Medical Association (AMA) “policy developed [in 2002] 
supports the scientific study of financial incentives and other motivators to increase the supply of 
organ donations from patients who recently died. . . . [F]inancial incentives are not intrinsically 
unethical, but may be ethical depending upon the balance of benefits and harms as established by 
factual data.” Id. UNOS supports the AMA position: “UNOS . . . endorsed the proposal to look at 
studies and support the study of financial incentives to see if there would be any benefit in the organ 
donation process with financial incentives.” Hearings, supra, at 43 (testimony of Robert Metzger, 
President-Elect, UNOS). However, both the National Kidney Foundation and the American Society for 
Transplant Surgeons oppose any financial compensation for organ donation. Hearings, supra, at 3, 59 
(statement of Rep. Chairman Greenwood; testimony of Abraham Shaked, President, American Society 
of Transplant Surgeons).  
 88. See generally Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a 
Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989).  
 89. For an article advocating the establishment of an international open market for human organs 
see Jason Altman, Organ Transplantations: The Need for an International Open Organ Market, 5 
TOURO INT’L L. REV. 161 (1994); see also Clifton Perry, Human Organs and the Open Market, 91 
ETHICS 63 (1980). 
 90. Frederick R. Parker, Jr. et al., Organ Procurement and Tax Policy, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 173 (2002). Wisconsin became the first state in the country to provide a tax incentive for living 
organ donation when Governor Jim Doyle signed Assembly Bill 477 into law on January 30, 2004. 
Governor Doyle Signs Legislation to Help Living Organ Donors With Financial Expenses of 
Donation, at http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.asp?prid=380 (Jan. 30, 2004). The 
newly enacted law allows living Wisconsin residents who donate their liver, pancreas, kidney, 
intestines, lung, or bone marrow to receive a one time state tax deduction of up to $10,000 for 
unreimbursed travel expenses, lodging expenses, and lost wages related to the donation. Act of Jan. 30, 
2004, 2003 Wis. Act 119 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 71.05(10)(i)). The law allows donors to subtract 
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A futures market for human organs would allow individuals to form a 
contract where their organs and tissues would be delivered to the 
purchasing entity upon the donor’s death.92 In exchange for the donor’s 
promise to donate, a certain sum would be paid to the donor’s estate for 
each organ or tissue successfully harvested.93 This proposal would apply 
only to procurement of organs, not to allocation, thus avoiding many 
potential problems.94 However, this system would likely not yield a large 
increase in organ donation because very few of the people who would 
form a futures contract would die in a manner that would allow for organ 
donation.95 Additionally, this system has the same failing as a presumed 
consent system: young, healthy people may often fail to consider their 
own mortality, and thus even if they wish to become donors, they may not 
take the necessary steps to form a futures contract ensuring that their 
organs will be donated upon their death.96
An open market for human organs would allow an individual to 
contract with a government agency for the donation of a specific organ 
upon the death of the donor.97 In exchange, the individual donor’s estate 
would receive some type of payment upon delivery of the organ after the 
donor’s death.98 This proposal differs from a futures market in that it could 
be applied not only to organ procurement, but to organ allocation as well, 
meaning that a prospective organ recipient could buy a new kidney or 
liver.99 This system is the most ethically unconscionable because of the 
costs associated with their donation from their federal adjusted gross income in computing their state 
income tax liability. Id. The annual loss in tax revenue due to the new law is estimated to be about 
$115,000. Xiao Zhang, Organ Donors Given a State Tax Deduction, WIS. STATE J., Jan. 31, 2004, at 
B1.   
 91. In 1994 Pennsylvania enacted a law creating the Organ Donation Awareness Trust Fund, 
allowing families of organ donors to receive compensation for funeral expenses. 1994 Pa. Legis. Serv. 
102 (West); see also Boyd, supra note 79, at 459–60 (describing how the Pennsylvania law has been 
implemented and its early success). 
 92. Cohen, supra note 88, at 2.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. See infra Part III.A (discussing potential problems with an organ market). 
 95. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 4. “Of the 2 million or so deaths that occur in the 
United States each year, estimates indicate that somewhere between 13,000 and 29,000 occur under 
circumstances that would allow the organs of the deceased to be transplanted.” Id. Only between 
0.0065% and 0.0145% of deaths each year could possibly result in organ donation, therefore a futures 
market would seem to yield a very small increase in the supply of transplantable organs. 
 96. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.   
 97. Altman, supra note 89, at 178. 
 98. Id. at 179. 
 99. Id. at 180–81. 
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inequities it would create: it would allow wealthy people to buy new 
organs, while poor people would be left to die for want of a transplant.100
Tax incentives for organ donation could operate in one of two ways.101 
First, if individuals agree to donate their organs upon death, they could 
receive a refundable income tax credit during their lifetime.102 Second, the 
Internal Revenue Code could be amended to allow both living and 
cadaveric organ donations to qualify as a charitable deduction for income, 
gift, and estate tax purposes.103 These tax incentive systems create the 
same problem as a futures market: people who agree to donate today and 
receive a tax credit may not ultimately die in a way that allows for their 
organs to be donated.104 Additionally, the problem of young, healthy 
people not considering their own mortality is also relevant here and may 
lead to a very small increase in the number of organs available for 
transplant.105
The final proposed system of financial compensation for organ 
donation, a funeral stipend to the donor’s family, has been implemented in 
Pennsylvania.106 Citizens of that state are allowed to make contributions to 
the Organ Donation Awareness Trust Fund when renewing their driver’s 
licenses; this fund is used to compensate the organ donor’s family for 
reasonable funeral expenses.107 Any payments from the fund are made 
directly to the funeral home or other organization, not to the donor’s 
family, thus avoiding potential problems of coercion and improper 
motives for consenting to the donation.108 While this is a step in the right 
direction, there is no evidence that funeral stipends alone will alleviate the 
entire shortage of transplantable organs in the United States.  
 100. Banks, supra note 84, at 82–83 (“Society must ensure . . . that a commercial system does not 
condone ‘life exchanges’ between vulnerable citizens and rich, powerful organ recipients.”). 
 101. Parker et al., supra note 90, at 175. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.; see also supra note 90 (describing the newly enacted tax deduction for living organ 
donors in Wisconsin).  
 104. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 105. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 106. 1994 Pa. Legis. Serv. 102 (West). 
 107. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8621, § 8622(b)(1) (2003). In addition to funeral expenses, the law 
also allows payment for “reasonable hospital and other medical expenses . . . and incidental expenses 
incurred by the donor or donor’s family in connection with making a vital organ donation.” Id. 
Payments are capped at $3,000 per donor. Id. 
 108. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8622(b)(1) (2003). This provision ensures that the statute complies 
with the NOTA’s prohibition on payment of valuable consideration in exchange for organs. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 274e. 
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E. The Current System of Egg Donation and Allocation 
The United States government does not currently regulate egg donation 
in the same way that organ donation is regulated.109 It is, therefore, left to 
private companies to retrieve eggs from donors and allocate them to 
recipients.110 The internet has proven to be a haven for these companies.111 
Generally, potential donors fill out an application and go through a 
screening process, completely designed and administered by the facility.112 
Egg recipients then choose their own donor, based on whatever 
characteristics they desire.113 Egg donors are usually compensated between 
 109. The definition of human organ in the NOTA does not include eggs or sperm. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 274e(c)(1). “[T]here is no legislation in the United States that regulates the practice of oocyte 
donation.” Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 107, 128.  
 110. “The United States . . . with its currently unregulated, market-driven system of oocyte 
donation, has a donor pool that adequately meets demand.” Baum, supra note 109, at 139; see also 
Cynthia B. Cohen, NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION xiii–xiv (Cynthia 
B. Cohen ed., 1996) (briefly describing the procedures and policies of four egg donation clinics). 
 111. Organizations such as Egg Donation, Inc., at http://www.eggdonor.com/ (last visited Aug. 
19, 2004), and OPTIONS National Fertility Registry, Inc., which was forced to shut down operations 
and its internet site as recently as October 10, 2003 at 10:25 pacific time, at http://www.fertility 
options.com/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2004), are examples of internet-based companies. Both of these 
websites, and countless others, recruit young women to become egg donors, as well as solicit infertile 
couples who desire to be egg recipients. Many of the websites allow recipients to specify physical 
traits of ideal donors, and the more desirable a donor is, the more she is generally paid. See Egg 
Donation, Inc., at http://www.eggdonor.com/?section=aboutus&page= ourprogram (last visited Aug. 
19, 2004). Egg Donation, Inc. boasts that potential egg recipients are able to view color photos and 
educational backgrounds of donors, as well as use a database equipped to search for donors by 
physical traits, racial groups, or religious background. Id. Additionally, Egg Donation, Inc. advertises 
that “Asian and Jewish egg donors are always in demand” and thus may receive higher rates of 
compensation. Egg Donation, Inc., at http://www.eggdonor.com/?section=donor&page=dfaq (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
 One particularly noteworthy website was created by Ron Harris, fashion photographer and creator 
of Aerobicise, where infertile couples can bid on the eggs and sperm of beautiful models, with the 
sperm or eggs going to the highest bidder, at www.ronsangels.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). His 
egg auction allows women to find “[a] better looking version of you” for a price of course. Id. Egg 
donors are reportedly paid between $15,000 and $150,000 for one completed cycle, at 
http://www.ronsangels.com/index2.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). 
 112. See David H. Barad, M.D. & Brian L. Cohen, M.D., Oocyte Donation Program at 
Montefiore Medical Center, Albert Einstein, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG 
DONATION, supra note 110, at 15; Nancy A. Klein, M.D. et al., Donor Oocyte Program at University 
of Washington Medical Center, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION, 
supra note 110, at 3; Patricia M. McShane, M.D., Oocyte Donation Service at IVF America-Boston, in 
NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION, supra note 110, at 29; Paulo D. 
Serafini, M.D., Oocyte Donation Program at Huntington Reproductive Center: Quality Control Issues, 
in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION, supra note 110, at 35. 
 113. See NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION, supra note 110, at 3–48. 
Recipients are allowed to browse through donor notebooks, which contain donor profiles including 
information related to the donor’s “ethnic background, physical traits, past fertility, academic interests, 
talents, motivation for donation, and general health information on the donor and her family.” Klein et 
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$1,000 and $5,000 per donation; however, some reports list donor 
compensation as high as $50,000.114 The current system of egg donation 
and allocation in the United States is essentially a free market system.115 
Those willing to donate do so, for compensation, and those wishing to be 
recipients must pay out of pocket.116  
al., supra note 112, at 9. 
 114. Baum, supra note 109, at 108. Egg Donation, Inc. lists donor compensation as ranging 
between $5,000 and $15,000 per cycle, with additional compensation for “exceptional donors.” Egg 
Donation, Inc., at http://www.eggdonor.com/?section=donor&page=fincomp (last visited Aug. 19, 
2004). See Sege, infra note 117 and accompanying text (citing one advertisement offering $50,000 
compensation to egg donors). 
 The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine has stated that 
payment rates above $5,000 require justification and payments over $10,000 “go beyond what is 
appropriate.” Financial Incentives in Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY S240, 
S243 (Supp. I 2004). These numbers are based on a 1993 study estimating that egg donors spend an 
average of 56 hours in the donation process and comparing compensation for sperm donors who 
typically spend an average of one hour in the donation process and are compensated between $60 and 
$75. Id. 
 In addition to compensation for healthy, fertile women donating their eggs, another compensation 
scheme is available for infertile women undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) themselves, called 
oocyte sharing. Id. at S240. In this process, infertile women are already undergoing the medical 
process to retrieve their own eggs for fertilization. Id. If the women agree to donate a certain 
proportion of the eggs retrieved to other infertile women, usually around half, their out of pocket 
expenses for the IVF procedure will be reduced by about half. Id. at S241. This egg sharing procedure 
is somewhat analogous to paired organ exchanges discussed at supra note 31.  
 The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine justifies financial 
compensation for egg donors on four distinct ethical grounds. Id. at S242. First, it claims that financial 
incentives increase the number of egg donors, thereby increasing the number of infertile couples able 
to have children. Id. Second, it contends that financial incentives do not discourage altruistic 
donations. Id. Third, financial incentives “advance the ethical goal of fairness to donors” by ensuring 
that the donors are allowed to benefit from their action. Id. Fourth, any undue influence or coercion 
associated with financial incentives may be less than the pressures felt by altruistic donors who are 
donating to friends or relatives. Id. 
 115. Baum, supra note 109, at 139 (stating that the United States currently has an “unregulated, 
market-driven system” for egg donation). 
 116. Egg Donation, Inc. provides an estimated cost sheet for potential recipients: $5,000 plus 10% 
of the egg donor fee is paid to Egg Donation, Inc. as a program fee; $600 for psychological screening 
of the egg donor; $1,000 for legal representation for the recipient couple; between $5,000 and $15,000 
for the egg donor’s fee; $350 for a major medical insurance policy; $300 for legal representation of the 
egg donor; miscellaneous travel expenses for the egg donor; and finally, between $15,000 and $20,000 
in medical fees for the IVF procedure, for a grand total of between $27,750 and $43,750. Egg 
Donation, Inc., at http://www.eggdonor.com/?section=recipient&page=financial (last visited Aug. 19, 
2004). 
 Insurance does not generally pay the costs of IVF for egg recipients. See generally Tarun Jain, 
M.D. et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 661 
(2002); Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 1215 (1997) (describing how most health insurance plans exclude infertility 
treatment because it is not medically necessary and collecting state laws mandating insurance coverage 
of infertility treatment). Some commentators argue that denying insurance coverage of infertility 
treatment is a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Thomas D. Flanigan, Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies and Insurance Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 38 
BRANDEIS L.J. 777, 815–16 (2000); Shorge Sato, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility and the Americans 
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F. The Science Behind Egg Donation 
Recruitment of egg donors is commonly done through community or 
college newspapers.117 Women wishing to become egg donors go through 
a rigorous screening process before any medical procedures are 
performed.118 Initially, most clinics perform a telephone evaluation of the 
potential donor, screening for age and fertility history.119 Clinics generally 
do not accept donors over the age of 35, due to an increased risk of genetic 
abnormalities.120 Next, a full donor application and program information 
sheet are sent to the potential donor.121 Once the completed application is 
approved by the clinic, the donor attends an orientation program at the 
clinic, after which there is a waiting period before any medical screening 
occurs.122
The American Society for Reproductive Medicine has published 
general standards governing the genetic screening of potential egg 
donors.123 These guidelines state that donors should not have certain 
genetically-linked diseases personally or have immediate family members 
with those diseases.124 Potential donors are also screened for infectious 
diseases including HIV, syphilis, and hepatitis B and C.125 Finally, 
potential donors undergo psychological screening for emotional stability, 
with Disabilities Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGS. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (2001–2002). That issue is beyond the 
scope of this Note. 
 117. Marsha J. Gorrill, Selection and Screening of Potential Oocyte Donors, in PRINCIPLES OF 
OOCYTE AND EMBRYO DONATION, supra note 53, at 38. One ad printed in the student newspapers at 
Harvard, MIT, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, the University of Pennsylvania, and the California Institute 
of Technology offered potential egg donors $50,000 compensation. Irene Sege, A $50,000 Dilemma on 
Campus; Top Students Wrestle with Egg Donor Lure, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1999, at A1.  
 118. Gorrill, supra note 117, at 38 (table 4.3 describes the time commitment for egg donors, which 
can be up to 9 hours solely for the screening process). 
 119. Id. at 37 (table 4.2 provides an overview of the screening process). Additionally, the potential 
donor is questioned about her menstrual cycle regularity, smoking history, height, weight, and method 
of contraception. Id. at 41. 
 120. Id. at 38. 
 121. Id. at 37 (table 4.2). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 41. The guidelines can be found in Appendix A: Minimal Genetic Screening for Gamete 
Donors, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY S15 (Supp. V 2002). 
 124. Appendix A: Minimal Genetic Screening for Gamete Donors, supra note 123, at S15. 
Diseases that would exclude a potential donor include Huntington’s disease, spina bifida, heart 
malformation, Tay-Sachs disease, sickle cell anemia, and cystic fibrosis. Id. at S15–16. (table A1 
shows genetic screening in various ethnic groups). 
 125. Gorrill, supra note 117, at 43–44 (see table 4.6 for percentages of programs surveyed that 
perform specific medical tests). 
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religious beliefs, and motivation for becoming a donor, among other 
things.126
The medical process for one egg donation cycle takes about three to 
four weeks to complete.127 The donor receives daily injections of 
hormones for 27 days, as well as periodic doctor’s office visits, blood 
draws, and ultrasounds.128 For the first 14 days, the donor receives 
injections for ovarian suppression, so that doctors can manipulate and 
control her reproductive system.129 For the last 9 to 12 days, a second daily 
injection is added to induce the donor’s ovaries to release multiple eggs.130 
During the last five days, the donor must also undergo daily blood draws 
to monitor the progress of the hormone therapy.131 Finally, the donor is 
sedated for the actual harvesting procedure.132 The doctor uses a vaginally-
inserted needle and an ultrasound guide to retrieve the eggs.133 The 
donor’s reproductive cycle returns to normal about two weeks after the 
donation cycle is completed.134
G. Legal Treatment of Egg Donation 
There is no federal law prohibiting financial compensation for egg or 
sperm donation.135 Louisiana is the only state with a law explicitly 
prohibiting payment to egg donors, although no prosecutions for the 
unlawful sale of human eggs have been filed.136
 126. Id. at 44–45. Other aspects of the psychological evaluation include an assessment of job and 
relationship stability, current life stress, sexual history (including abuse), financial status, and legal 
history. Id. at 44 (table 4.7).   
 127. Id. at 37. 
 128. Id. at 39 (figure 4.1 gives a detailed overview of the medical procedures for both the egg 
donor and recipient). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. The NOTA specifically excludes gametes from the definition of human organ, so the 
prohibition against financial compensation does not apply to gametes. 42 U.S.C. § 274e; see also 
Boyd, supra note 79, at 458 (“[NOTA] does not interpret an organ to include blood, sperm, and ova.”). 
There is some debate over whether the UAGA prohibits the sale of eggs because of its broad definition 
of organ which includes “blood, fluid, or other portion of a human body.” UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT 
ACT § 1(7), 8A U.L.A. 18 (2003). However, it is generally agreed upon that the UAGA does not 
prohibit the sale of human eggs. Crockin, supra note 53, at 254. 
 136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2000) (“The sale of a human ovum, fertilized human ovum, or 
human embryo is expressly prohibited.”); see also John A. Robertson, Legal Uncertainties in Human 
Egg Donation, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE CASE OF EGG DONATION, supra note 110, at 
182–83 (analyzing various state laws prohibiting the sale of organs to determine if the sale of eggs 
falls under the prohibitions and stating that no prosecutions have been initiated under such state laws 
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III. PROPOSAL 
The current altruistic system of organ donation in the United States 
must be modified to alleviate the critical shortage of transplantable organs. 
This Note proposes that organ donation should be compensated in a 
fashion similar to the current system of compensation for egg donation. 
Egg donation and organ donation are analogous for several reasons. First, 
both egg donation and organ donation are physically-invasive procedures 
with some health risks to the donor.137 Second, neither eggs nor organs are 
renewable within the body; the supply of each is limited.138 Additionally, it 
could be argued that organ donation serves a more important social 
function, saving already existing lives, than egg donation does, allowing 
infertile couples to reproduce genetically-similar children when they could 
adopt. 
A market for organ procurement, as opposed to a market for allocation, 
should be established to increase the supply of transplantable organs and 
the current system of organ allocation should be left untouched.139 Under 
this proposed system either the OPO or the state would compensate donors 
for the transplantable organs donated, again, leaving in place the current 
system of organ allocation. This is similar to how infertility clinics 
currently operate.140 By leaving the current system of organ allocation in 
place while modifying the organ procurement system, there would likely 
for the sale of eggs). For a collection of state statutes banning the sale of body parts see Baum, supra 
note 109, at 126 n.54.  
 137. See supra notes 30–46, 117–34 and accompanying text. Health risks of egg donation include 
side-effects from daily hormone injections (hot flashes, fatigue, emotional instability, bloating, and 
cramping), complications during egg retrieval (pain, infection, bleeding, and an adverse reaction to 
anesthesia), and long term consequences (infertility and an increased risk of ovarian cancer). Gorrill, 
supra note 117, at 40 (table 4.4). Health risks associated with living organ donation include lung 
collapse, nerve injuries, urinary tract infections, wound site infections, pneumonia, and death. Allen et 
al., supra note 30, at 181–85.  
 138. Unlike human sperm, which are constantly renewed within the body, there are a finite 
number of eggs in every female at the time of her birth. JACKSON, supra note 20, at 165; see also 
supra notes 30–46, 117–34 and accompanying text.  
 139. A good description of the differences between markets for procurement and markets for 
allocation can be found in Kaserman, supra note 13, at 575. Generally, a market for procurement 
involves payment to the organ donor, by either the state or an OPO, to obtain a supply of 
transplantable organs, whereas a market for allocation involves payment by the organ recipient to the 
state or an OPO to obtain a new organ for personal use. Id.; see also supra note 48 and accompanying 
text. For a description of the current system of organ allocation in the United States, see supra note 50 
and accompanying text. 
 140. Clinics recruit the egg donors and give them compensation for their donated eggs; the 
compensation generally does not come directly from the egg recipients. See supra notes 109–16 and 
accompanying text. However, some agencies, such as www.ronsangels.com, supra note 111, allow 
recipient couples to bid on donor eggs, with the eggs going to the highest bidder. 
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be an overall increase in the supply of transplantable organs with no 
resultant harm to the present equitable system of distribution.  
A. Arguments Opposing a Market for Organ Procurement 
The main argument against establishing a market for organ 
procurement is economic coercion.141 Market opponents insist that poor, 
destitute people from around the world will be forced into selling their 
organs without making an informed decision.142 There are several flaws 
with this argument.143 First, the economic coercion argument is based on 
the false premise that the prices donors will be paid for their organs will be 
high enough to override their doubts and ethical concerns about becoming 
a donor.144 In the proposed market system for organ procurement, either 
OPOs or the state will be paying the donors; thus preventing potential 
wealthy recipients from driving up the prices paid for organs.145 With only 
moderate prices being paid to organ donors, economic incentives would 
likely not outweigh a donor’s moral objections to donation, and thus no 
economic coercion would occur.146 Additionally, the current market 
system for egg donation suggests that economic coercion would not be a 
problem in a market for organ procurement.147 A majority of egg donors 
are not poor or minority women, and the amounts paid to them for their 
donations are usually not an “undue inducement to undergo the medical 
 141. Abdallah S. Daar, Paid Organ Donation: Towards an Understanding of the Issues, in ORGAN 
AND TISSUE DONATION FOR TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 30, at 48 (describing countries that allow 
paid donation as being involved in “rampant commercialism” where donors are being used without 
regard to their future health); Jefferies, supra note 81, at 622–23 (describing India and various South 
American countries as having free market procurement systems for nonregenerative organs where the 
poor are exploited to provide organs to the rich); see also Banks, supra note 84, at 74–75 (discussing a 
report of an Egyptian man who sold his kidney because he had no prospect of work); KASERMAN & 
BARNETT, supra note 5, at 75–79 (discussing coercion and other ethical arguments against markets for 
organs). 
 142. Opponents cite reports of people offering to sell their kidneys for various monetary reasons. 
PRICE, supra note 5, at 368; Banks, supra note 84, at 74–75. 
 143. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 76–77 (discussing four major problems with the 
economic coercion argument). 
 144. Id. Kaserman and Barnett provide a very detailed economic analysis of how a market system 
for organ procurement would work and suggest that “the equilibrium price of cadaveric organs is 
likely to be quite low.” Id. 
 145. Id. at 78 (explaining that the economic coercion argument fails because it neglects to 
distinguish between markets for procurement and markets for allocation).  
 146. Id. at 77. 
 147. Only one state has expressly outlawed payments associated with egg donation, which 
suggests that the practice is not seen as coercive and worthy of legislation in the other 49 states. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (2000). 
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risks involved.”148 These facts suggest that if a system of financial 
compensation for organ donation were established, comparable to the 
system already in place for egg donation, there would similarly be no 
economic coercion of donors. 
A second argument commonly advanced against proposed markets for 
organ procurement is that any such market would reduce altruism and 
people who would have donated their organs under an altruistic system 
will no longer want to donate their organs under a market system because 
they find a market for human organs despicable.149 However, there is no 
evidence that altruism and a market system cannot coexist.150 A 
comparison to the current blood market in the United States shows that 
there is no evidence of reduced altruism in that system, which relies on 
altruistic donations as well as paid donations.151
A final argument commonly advanced against proposed markets for 
organ procurement is that such markets would create unequal access to 
organs depending on the potential recipient’s wealth.152 This concern only 
applies to markets for organ allocation, not procurement as advocated 
here.153 A market for organ allocation would likely have this problem; 
wealthy recipients would be able to bid for their new kidneys, while poor 
recipients would be left helpless.154 However, a market system of 
 148. Crockin, supra note 53, at 255; see also Erica K. German et al., Does Increasing Ovum 
Donor Compensation Lead to Differences in Donor Characteristics?, 76 FERTILITY & STERILITY 75 
(2001) (this study showed that an increase in the amount paid to the egg donor did not result in a 
change in the population of women willing to donate). 
 149. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 79 (stating that a “market environment may cause 
some former altruists to refuse to supply their organs at death”); PRICE, supra note 5, at 389 (outlining 
the main arguments against establishing a market in organs, including a “consequential reduction in 
altruism.”). 
 150. PRICE, supra note 5, at 397 (“Indeed, some suggest that a market for organs may even 
enhance altruism by allowing one to ‘give’ without payment while one could instead be paid.”).  
 151. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 86 (stating that the “blood market evidence appears 
to provide no indication of a significant reduction in total collections as the result of payments to 
donors.”); see also Baum, supra note 109, at 136–40 (discussing a well known book, The Gift 
Relationship, written by Robert Titmuss that argued that paid blood donations would undermine 
altruism and “devalue the meaning of charitable donations.”). 
 152. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 78 (discussing a “fear that, if organs are purchased 
from suppliers, only wealthy individuals will be able to afford transplants.”). There is already a great 
divide in access to health care in the United States between the rich and the poor. See generally John 
Z. Ayanian, et al., Unmet Health Needs of Uninsured Adults in the United States, 284 JAMA 2061 
(2000) (noting that insured people in the United States have much greater access to needed health care 
than uninsured people); R.F. St. Peter et al., Access to Care for Poor Children. Separate and 
Unequal?, 267 JAMA 2760 (1992) (finding that children below the poverty line do not receive the 
same medical care that children above the poverty line receive). 
 153. See supra notes 48, 139 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between markets 
for organ procurement and markets for organ allocation). 
 154. Recent reports from South Africa state that a black market organ transplant ring charged up 
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procurement will not in any way affect how organs are currently allocated 
by UNOS.  
B. Arguments Favoring a Market for Organ Procurement 
In addition to the dire need for an increase in the supply of 
transplantable organs, there are two main arguments favoring a market 
system for organ procurement over other possible systems designed to 
increase the supply of organs.155 First, every person has an interest in self-
determination and autonomy.156 American society puts a very high value 
on individual autonomy, allowing people to make decisions about their 
bodies and lives personally, without interference from the government or 
others.157 Indeed, it is quite legal to sell one’s blood, sperm, eggs, or hair 
today.158 Additionally, people are currently allowed to altruistically donate 
their organs, either while living or after their death.159 This personal 
autonomy should be extended to allow people to sell their organs in a 
market for organ procurement if they so choose. 
The other main argument supporting a market for organ procurement 
over other possible reforms is based on utilitarian grounds.160 If a market 
to $120,000 to the recipient of a new kidney. Michael Wines, 14 Arrested in the Sale of Organs for 
Transplant, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at A7. This incident demonstrates that if organs are allocated 
based on ability to pay, the wealthy would likely be the beneficiaries, leaving the poor with little hope 
of receiving a new organ.  
 155. Jefferies, supra note 81, at 649 (stating that any proposed reform must maximize the increase 
in supply of organs, eliminate shortages, and minimize invasions into individual autonomy). 
 156. PRICE, supra note 5, at 227 (noting John Stuart Mill’s harm principle that states that the only 
justification for prohibiting the conduct of individuals is the protection of others); Daar, supra note 
141, at 54 (“The decision to assume a risk should be made by the individual person concerned.”). 
 157. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 19 (5th ed. 
1999). Beauchamp and Walters state that personal autonomy “is rooted in the liberal moral and 
political tradition of the importance of individual freedom and choice.” Id. They define autonomy as 
“freedom from external constraint and the presence of critical mental capacities such as understanding, 
intending, and voluntary decision-making capacity.” Id. Beauchamp and Walters continue to argue that 
personal autonomy should only be restricted “[i]f an individual’s choices endanger the public health, 
potentially harm another party, or involve a scarce resource for which the patient cannot pay.” Id. at 
20; see also PRICE, supra note 5, at 385 (stating that the main argument supporting a market for organ 
procurement is that “individuals have the right to supply parts of their body for therapeutic purposes if 
they wish where this does not cause harm to others.”). 
 158. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 159. See supra notes 24–27, 30 and accompanying text. 
 160. BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 157, at 10. Beauchamp and Walters explain that 
“[u]tilitarianism is rooted in the thesis that an action or practice is right (when compared to any 
alternative action or practice) if it leads to the greatest possible balance of good consequences or to the 
least possible balance of bad consequences in the world as a whole.” Id. The desired outcome of any 
moral decision is to “promote human welfare by minimizing harms and maximizing benefits.” Id. at 
11.  
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for organ procurement is created, this will likely increase the supply of 
transplantable organs thereby increasing the total good for society because 
fewer people will die waiting for a transplant.161  
Finally, it is worth pointing out that there are no tangible problems with 
a market for organ procurement per se; rather, any problems that may arise 
can be attributed to potential abuses of the market system.162 This concern 
only suggests that any market for organ procurement that is implemented 
should be closely regulated to ensure that these abuses do not come to 
fruition.163 The proposal in this Note already addressed several possible 
problems. First, because only a market for procurement is proposed, there 
will be no inequitable distribution of transplantable organs based on ability 
to pay.164 Second, because either the OPO or the state will be paying 
compensation to the donors, prices will be kept low and economic 
coercion will likely not be a concern.165 Finally, the system proposed is 
very similar to the system currently in place for egg donation, which has 
not exhibited the potential abuses frequently cited by opponents of market 
systems for organ procurement.166  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Organ transplantation became a medical reality in 1954.167 Since that 
time, medical advances in immunosuppressive therapy and life-sustaining 
treatment such as kidney dialysis have dramatically increased the demand 
for transplantable organs.168 As of January 16, 2005, there were 87,315 
 161. If a market for organ procurement were created there would presumably be a greater number 
of transplantable organs available. See generally Daar, supra note 141, at 54 (“Paid organ donation is 
justified ethically on utilitarian grounds because it will increase transplants and therefore the total 
amount of good for society.”). Donors would be paid, a good consequence under utilitarianism, and 
recipients would receive life-saving organs, another good consequence. Thus, a market system for 
organ procurement would maximize benefits and be desirable in a utilitarian system. 
 162. Daar, supra note 141, at 54 (“There are no compelling arguments against the sale of organs 
per se. It is the potential abuse which is worrying.”); see also supra notes 141–54 and accompanying 
text.  
 163. Currently, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged with issuing and enforcing 
regulations to ensure that the nation’s blood supply is safe, labeled properly, and to prevent the 
introduction and spread of communicable diseases. 42 U.S.C. §§ 262–264 (2000). The blood supply in 
the United States is heavily regulated. 21 C.F.R. §§ 606.3–606.171 (2004). If a market for organ 
procurement were established, a similar level of regulation would be warranted to ensure safety and 
protect against potential abuses. 
 164. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 78.  
 165. Id. at 76 (stating that prices for organs in a market system will likely be low). 
 166. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
 167. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text.  
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people waiting for an organ transplant.169 In 2001, 6,584 people died while 
on the waiting list for an organ transplant.170 Today, there is a critical 
shortage in the number of organs available for transplantation and 
something must be done to increase the supply of transplantable organs.  
This Note proposes a market for organ procurement, analogous to the 
current market for egg donation, where OPOs or the state would pay 
donors for their organs. This system is desirable because organs and eggs 
are similar in many respects.171 They are both nonrenewable and donation 
of each involves invasive procedures with substantial medical risk to the 
donor.172 Even the AMA has endorsed a “scientific study of financial 
incentives . . . to increase the supply of organ donations.”173 Congress 
responded to pressure from the medical community in 1984 and passed the 
NOTA, prohibiting financial compensation for organ donation.174 
Circumstances have changed dramatically since 1984, and Congress 
should once again respond to this health care crisis by establishing a 
market for organ procurement in the United States. 
Margaret R. Sobota* 
 169. UNOS, at http://www.unos.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). 
 170. 2003 UNOS Annual Report, supra note 9, at table 1.7.  
 171. See supra notes 20–21, 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 20–21, 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 173. Hearings, supra note 87, at 51 (testimony of Dr. Sade).  
 174. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that the NOTA was passed in response to 
the medical community’s outrage at a Virginia physician who brokered living donor kidneys; political 
pressure to ensure an altruistic system led to the passage of the NOTA). 
 * B.A. Biology (2002), B.A. Philosophy (2002), University of North Carolina; J.D. Candidate 
(2005), Washington University School of Law. Thanks to my family for reading and commenting on 
early drafts, especially to my Dad who never got the chance to read this final copy. 
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